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I.  Introduction 
Until about ten years ago, international discussions of national economic policies were 
compartmentalized.  International trade policies were the province of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and were discussed and negotiated primarily by specialists on trade.  
Policies involving labor markets, including labor standards, were similarly discussed only among 
specialists on labor, with international initiatives centered in the International Labor Organization 
(ILO).  Similar compartmentalization existed for intellectual property issues in the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), and also for environmental issues, which unlike the 
others were spread among several international bodies.   
This all began to change in the early 1990s, for several reasons to be mentioned below.  
Some of this compartmentalization has already disappeared, and more of it seems to be on the 
way out, as important constituencies now favor integrating the issues under a single institutional 
framework.  Because the successor to the GATT, the World Trade Organization (WTO), is the 
only international organization with meaningful enforcement powers, it has become the favored 
place for integrating these diverse policy issues.  Intellectual property rights issues have already 
been taken over by the WTO in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual   5
Property Rights (TRIPS).   Some advocates of labor and environmental rights have asked that 
these issues also be taken over by the WTO, and that they be enforced by the same mechanism 
that it uses for policing trade policies.  This paper reviews the arguments for and against such 
integration in the case of labor standards. 
We will first try to put the debate into context by reviewing the issues and the events 
that have led to the current situation.  We will next turn to the arguments in favor of putting labor 
standards into the WTO, then address the arguments against doing so.  Finally we will offer our 
own advice to developing countries as to the position that they should take in this debate, and 
how more broadly they should deal with this and other issues in multilateral trade negotiations.  
We conclude with an epilogue, noting that the linkage issues were not discussed at the 
November 2001 WTO Ministerial Meeting in Doha, Qatar, but that these issues might well re-
emerge under different circumstances in the future. 
 
II.  Background and Issues 
We are ourselves all specialists in the economics of international trade, and we are 
therefore much better versed in the history, institutions, and economic case for trade than we are 
knowledgeable about labor standards.  However, precisely because of the debate we will be 
describing, we have had occasion in recent years to become more familiar with labor issues and 
to write several joint and individually authored papers on the subject.
1  It is from these 
perspectives that we will first provide a brief overview of the issues that arise in both trade and 
labor, and of how they have been dealt with in the world’s institutions.   6
The core problem of international trade policy is that countries and their governments 
have a variety of incentives to restrict trade, usually imports, and that such restrictions are 
economically harmful both to other countries and to those within the restricting countries who do 
not benefit directly from protection.  Left to their own devices governments may be unable to 
resist these incentives, with the result that all countries in the world are made worse off.  The 
incentives may be macroeconomic, as they were in the Great Depression of the 1930s when 
countries raised tariffs to divert demand from other countries toward themselves.  Or they may 
be microeconomic and political, as is often the case today when countries protect individual 
industries or groups of workers from import competition. 
The GATT was created at the end of World War II to prevent countries from restricting 
trade for these and other purposes, although it did allow tariffs to be raised in several specified 
circumstances.  One of those circumstances was, as a last resort, if one country violated 
GATT’s rules.  After other remedies were exhausted, an offending country could become the 
target of retaliatory tariffs, the purpose being to provide enforcement of GATT rules.  This 
“dispute settlement mechanism” (DSM) of the GATT was rather weak, for institutional reasons, 
but these weaknesses were removed in the WTO.  A major difference between the WTO and 
its GATT predecessor is the strength of the WTO DSM, which employs several layers of 
procedure that lead ultimately, if offending behavior is found and not reversed, to “trade 
sanctions.”  That is, the ultimate remedy against a country breaking GATT/WTO rules is for 
other countries to restrict imports from it by use of increased tariffs. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
1 See Brown et al. (1996, 1998, 2001a,b), Brown (2000, 2001), and Stern (1999).   7
Given the understanding that trade restrictions are economically harmful, even to the 
country that imposes them, this feature of the WTO is somewhat perverse, for it seeks to 
prevent harmful behavior by use of more of the same.  The rationale must be that the sanctions 
will seldom be used, and that the threat of them will almost always be enough to force eventual 
compliance with the rules.  Experience so far suggests that most WTO cases do not, indeed, 
result in trade sanctions.  However, their use in some recent disputes between the United States 
and the European Union involving bananas, beef hormones and possibly corporate tax 
exemptions has been sufficiently disturbing that one may easily wish that some other 
enforcement mechanism were available.  The main reason for the absence of any other 
mechanism, presumably, is that the GATT and WTO have had jurisdiction only over trade and 
have had to find their remedies within that jurisdiction.  Had the WTO been able, say, to impose 
monetary fines on countries for breaking its rules, then that would undoubtedly have been 
preferable. 
Turning now to labor standards, here the core problem is to improve the well being of 
workers around the world.  The need arose, or at least was recognized, when workers moved 
off the land and into factories, where working conditions were often both poor and out of the 
workers’ control.  The motivation for improvement was provided in part by humanitarian 
concern for the workers, and in part by fear of social unrest if the growing number of industrial 
workers were to give vent to their unhappiness.  There was also a perceived need to coordinate 
improvement in working conditions across countries, so as to avoid undermining the 
international competitiveness of countries that achieved such improvement by themselves. All of   8
these concerns contributed to the creation of the ILO in 1919, which today has 175 member 
states. 
The ILO has done many things, including most notably the adoption of a series of 
Conventions that spell out a long list of labor standards.  At the core of this list are eight 
“Fundamental ILO Conventions” in four areas:  freedom of association, abolition of forced 
labor, equality, and elimination of child labor.  Additional conventions address a much wider 
variety of issues, including basic human rights, conditions of work such as wages and hours, 
security of employment, and many more.
2 
These conventions have been adopted by many of the member countries, with the 
notable exception of the United States, which has adopted only a few.  However, regardless of 
whether a member country has adopted a convention, the ILO has relatively little that it can do 
to enforce adherence to it.  Its “enforcement” powers consist primarily of several mechanisms 
for monitoring and reporting abuses of the standards, but there is little that it can do to a 
country, even if the country flaunts a standard, except to publicize the fact.  The strongest action 
it can take is to censure a country for noncompliance, and this is hardly ever done. Most would 
agree that in the vast majority of countries the conventions serve at best as goals that the 
member countries may be striving to achieve in the future, rather than as descriptions of current 
practice.  This is true even in those countries that have adopted them. 
It is this lack of “teeth” in the ILO that has led to interest, on the part of many who wish 
to advance labor rights, in incorporating them somehow into the WTO.  The objective is clear:  
to be able to apply the WTO enforcement mechanisms, which it already applies to violations of   9
rules on trade policy, to violations of labor rights as well.  Interest in doing this has been 
advanced by several events.   
One of these events was the expansion of GATT and later WTO procedures to deal 
with what many regarded as domestic policies.  As GATT gradually expanded its coverage 
beyond “border measures” such as import tariffs to other policies that might affect trade, it 
began to deal with domestic policies such as government procurement and product standards, 
whose primary purpose may have had nothing to do with trade but whose effects could impinge 
on trade and on foreign producers.  The effect of this expansion was no doubt good for trade, 
but it blurred the distinction between trade policies and other policies.  Some individuals and 
groups whose interests lay outside of trade, including certainly some environmentalists, began to 
object strenuously to this expansion of the GATT/WTO onto their turf, and they wished to see 
its activities curtailed.  But others, including advocates of labor rights, saw an opportunity, if they 
could only harness the procedures of trade policy to their own cause. 
A second event contributing to the desire for linkage was the precedent set by the 
TRIPS Agreement that was negotiated as part of the new WTO.  In spite of its name, TRIPS 
really is not limited to issues involving trade, but instead covers the entire intellectual property 
regimes of the WTO member countries.  It requires specific standards of intellectual property 
protection (patents, copyrights, trademarks, etc.) that must be enforced in these countries, 
including in sectors such as pharmaceuticals that some developing countries had previously 
exempted from such protection.  Furthermore, the rules of TRIPS are covered under the same 
DSM as the rest of the WTO provisions, meaning that trade sanctions can be used for their 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
2 See Brown et al. (1996) for more details on ILO conventions.   10
enforcement, again as a last resort.  Since the economic case for TRIPS was questionable,
3 its 
connection with trade was tenuous, and it was evident in any case that TRIPS was primarily a 
response to political pressure from multinational enterprises (MNEs) seeking to extend their 
markets, TRIPS provided both the example and part of the justification for labor interests to 
extend the WTO to labor standards as well. 
Finally and more broadly, the rapid expansion of international trade and investment 
during the last half of the twentieth century accelerated in the 1990s and contributed to 
increasing concern over “globalization.”
4  This concern has included a wide variety of symptoms 
and issues on the part of an even wider variety of constituencies. But certainly a major part of it 
was the perception that globalization had hurt workers, at least in industrialized countries and 
relative to owners of capital and more valuable skills.  Although this perception is only partially 
justified, according to most careful economic studies that have been done,
5 it is popularly 
believed and attributed to the increasing political and economic power of corporations, 
especially MNEs relative to workers.  The WTO itself is believed by many to have been 
created solely for the benefit of corporations, and the example of TRIPS does little to contradict 
this perception.  This too, then, has fed the desire to countervail against the corporate interests 
within the WTO by bringing labor interests on board as well. 
In fact, although it is true that the WTO does serve many corporate interests, and that 
its creation may well have depended on this fact, it is not primarily an agent of corporate 
control.  Instead, the benefits that it provides to the world are spread very broadly and extend 
                                                                 
3 See Deardorff (1990). 
4 See Deardorff and Stern (2002). 
5 See for example Freeman (1995).   11
especially to the poorest countries and the poorest people within those countries, including 
labor.  What most of the rules of the WTO do, and those of the GATT before it, is to foster 
international competition, permitting sellers from many countries to compete with domestic 
sellers in the member countries.  This is certainly beneficial for the owners – mostly corporate – 
of the firms that due to low cost, high quality, or effective strategy are best able to compete with 
other firms, but it can drive other less able firms, often also corporate, out of business.  
Lobbyists for protection have always included plenty of corporations seeking to secure their 
domestic markets, and the WTO is not their friend.  Naturally, the corporations who succeed 
best in an environment of open markets tend to become large and to qualify for the moniker, 
MNE, or “transnational corporation.” But in fact, no matter how large these firms become, as 
long as open international markets force them to compete with enough others like themselves, 
none of them has the power that their opponents ascribe to them. 
The real beneficiaries of the world trading system that has grown up under the GATT 
and WTO are ordinary people in all countries.  The thriving world economy has naturally 
created the most visible benefits for those who can afford the most consumption, and this means 
the populations of the industrialized countries whose standards of living today are 
unprecedented and owe a great deal to trade, whether they know it or not.  But in our view, the 
most important beneficiaries from the world trading system are probably workers in developing 
countries, even though they remain (with some exceptions) far poorer than their counterparts 
abroad.
6   
                                                                 
6 In this connection, see Brown, Deardorff, and Stern (2002).   12
Without liberal trade, the United States and its people would have remained well off, 
just not quite as well off as they are today.  The same is probably true of Europe, Japan, and 
other industrialized countries.  But without liberal trade, the pressures of population growth and 
resource depletion in developing countries would have driven many of them even further into 
poverty.  Instead, trade has permitted wages in many developing countries to rise, albeit far less 
than we would hope eventually to see. 
This could not have happened, very likely, without the GATT.  Without it, the rich 
countries would almost certainly have yielded to the above-mentioned incentives to restrain 
trade, if not in good times then surely when crises and recession caused them to turn inward, as 
they did in the 1930s.  It was the GATT that prevented this, first by limiting the circumstances 
under which countries could restrict trade, and second by facilitating successive rounds of 
negotiations to reduce trade barriers.  Successful corporations gained hugely from this process, 
and it was they who more than anyone else drove the process forward.  Indeed, developing 
countries often resisted the liberalization of trade and even sought exemption from liberalizing 
themselves, to their own cost as many later learned.  But by fostering as much liberalization as it 
did, and by restraining the rich countries from throwing around their economic weight, the 
GATT has left most developing countries far better off today than they would otherwise have 
been. 
Those who see the world economy as a contest between capital and labor find this very 
hard to accept.  To them, anything that benefits capital must hurt labor, as though the world 
economy provides only a certain total of benefit for all and the only question is which group gets 
it.  From that perspective, because they perceive the WTO as promoting the interests of capital,   13
they either want it destroyed or want labor to be given equal power within it.  This is certainly 
part of the motivation for linking labor rights to trade through formal inclusion in the WTO. 
To most economists, this is just not the way the world economy works.  Economic 
benefit arises only from the efficient application of both capital and labor, which together 
produce the economic pie.  The purpose of the WTO is to help make this pie as large as 
possible, which is best accomplished through the forces of competition in free markets that 
guide resources into their most productive uses.  Incidentally, this same competition also 
determines how the pie is divided among different groups, including capital and labor, 
developed and developing, and rich and poor.  This division is not what many, including 
economists, would most like to see.  But it is important not to try to alter this division with 
policies that will so reduce the size of the pie that even the poor will be made worse off.  It is 
from that perspective that economists like ourselves tend to respond to proposals to link trade 
and labor standards. 
It is also the case that linking even seemingly unrelated issues in a round of negotiations 
can have the added benefit of deepening agreements in both policy dimensions when linkage 
improves enforcement power.  For example, Spagnolo (1999) considers the case in which two 
governments are attempting to cooperate over two separate policy issues, e.g., tariffs and labor 
standards.  Both of these policy issues are characterized by a prisoner’s dilemma; that is, both 
countries would gain if they could find a sustainable mechanism to cooperate on lower tariffs 
and higher labor standards, but an inferior outcome emerges in the absence of cooperation. 
In a repeated prisoner’s dilemma game, cooperation can be self-enforcing if the benefit 
of defecting in any round of the game is smaller than the cost of lost cooperation in all   14
succeeding rounds.  Thus, one strategy for sustaining cooperation in a repeated prisoner’s 
dilemma game is a trigger strategy:  cooperate as long as the other party cooperates, but make 
clear that if the other party ever defects, then there will be no future cooperative behavior.  
When policy issues become linked in an international agreement, defection on either tariff or 
labor standards commitments will cause the entire agreement to collapse.  Consequently, 
defection from a linked agreement results in the loss of benefits from cooperation on both tariffs 
and labor standards.   Employing linkage to raise the cost of defecting from either tariff or labor 
standards commitments should help to sustain compliance in both dimensions. 
It is also possible that linking trade and labor standards in a single round of negotiations 
might produce additional bargaining efficiencies by transferring some enforcement power from 
the trade dimension to the labor dimension.  In this connection, Limao (2000) considers a case 
in which the international community has found it relatively easy to achieve a nearly optimal 
agreement on tariffs but has had greater difficulty finding a self-enforcing agreement on labor 
standards.  If tariffs and labor standards are linked together, the likely agreement would consist 
of less trade liberalization but tighter labor standards than would have occurred in a partitioned 
agreement.  Nevertheless, world welfare is higher than in the absence of linkage because the 
gains from improving the relatively inadequate labor standards are larger than the losses from 
raising the already close-to-optimal tariff levels.  
 
III.  Arguments in Favor of Linking 
 
Trade Sanctions as an Enforcement Device 
   15
The most direct argument for linking labor standards to trade in the WTO should be 
obvious from the discussion above.  Anyone who favors raising the level and enforcement of 
labor standards around the world would presumably prefer additional tools to make that 
happen, and trade can provide such a tool.  Trade sanctions have long been used to pressure 
countries to alter their behavior, albeit with mixed success.  The hope is that by threatening a 
country with restriction or taxes on exports, the country would be motivated to avoid that by 
improving its labor standards.  Experience suggests that when such tools are used in a hostile 
environment, they often fail.  But here, by using them within the agreed upon DSM of the WTO 
to enforce labor standards that many countries have also accepted within the ILO, it seems 
plausible that compliance might be more forthcoming.  If so, then the trade sanctions themselves 
would seldom actually be applied, and the goal of improving labor standards would be 
achieved. 
 
Setting Efficient Labor Standards 
Implicit in this argument is the belief that countries cannot be trusted to set labor 
standards optimally for their own populations, and therefore that they need external inducement 
to do the right thing. Where governments are corrupt and/or non-democratic, this may not be 
questioned.  However, for reasonably well-functioning democracies the case for external 
pressure must be argued with care.  That is, governments have a strong interest in adopting 
economic policies, including labor standards, that promote economic efficiency. 
Inefficient policy-making even in a democracy may occur for a couple of different 
reasons.  First, we might make a political economy argument.  Just as with trade policies, labor   16
policies are also set in response to many conflicting incentives, political and economic.  
Consequently, the public may be better served by governments that are externally constrained.  
For example, owners of capital are likely to have disproportionate power compared to labor, 
and they thus may be able to influence government to set or to enforce weak labor standards.  
Just as political forces favoring trade protection may be more effectively and beneficially resisted 
by membership in the GATT/WTO, forces favoring weak labor standards may also be resisted 
if labor standards are made part of the WTO.  Governments may welcome the assistance, even 
if they cannot say so. 
Second, even governments that are able to choose nationally optimal labor standards 
policies, may still over- or under-regulate labor markets when viewed from the point of view of 
worldwide economic efficiency.  A discrepancy between efficiency and nationally optimal 
policies will emerge when labor standards alter the volume of trade to such an extent that world 
prices are disturbed. 
For example, a large capital-abundant country, when considering a change in an existing 
labor standard, may at least consider the domestic costs and benefits of the standard at the 
margin.  In addition, such a country may also consider the impact that the labor standard has on 
its international terms of trade.  A large capital-abundant country may realize that a tightened 
labor standard may also result in a larger volume of labor-intensive imports that can be 
purchased on world markets only if the world price of labor-intensive goods also rises.  That is, 
tightened labor standards tend to turn the terms of trade against large capital-abundant 
countries.   17
As a consequence, when policy-makers in our hypothetical country consider the 
economic effects of a tightened labor standard, they require that the domestic benefits exceed 
the domestic costs by enough to offset the national cost of the deterioration in the terms of 
trade.  However, from a world-efficiency point of view, terms-of-trade effects are zero-sum.  
That is, terms of trade losses for one country are gains for another, and thus should be ignored 
in any evaluation of the benefits and costs of the labor standard under consideration.  This 
analysis suggests, then, that large capital-abundant countries may set their labor standards at a 
point where the marginal benefit exceeds marginal cost, thus under-regulating their labor 
markets. 
 
Bargaining Inefficiencies in the WTO 
In fact, both the political economy and the terms-of-trade externality considerations are 
a part of a more general argument in favor of incorporating labor standards into the WTO.  
Bagwell and Staiger (2001) have noted that when we negotiate over border controls and labor 
standards separately, bargaining inefficiencies are likely to emerge.  The inefficiency arises due 
to the fact that border controls and labor standards can be considered to be policy substitutes.  
That is, either can be used to accomplish protectionist objectives. 
The protectionist content of labor standards has already been alluded to above.  Weak 
labor standards in a capital-abundant country benefit import-competing producers by lowering 
their labor costs.  The consequent increase in domestic production also lowers import demand.   
Thus, lax labor standards are able in principle to accomplish the twin trade policy goals of   18
protecting domestic import-competing interests and exercising monopoly control over the terms 
of trade. 
Given the parallels between border controls and labor standards, protectionist urges 
may be deflected onto labor standards.  In a single-dimensional negotiating environment in 
which we agree to constrain the use of trade policies, governments are motivated to replace 
inefficient trade policies with inefficient labor policies.  That is, following a round of trade 
negotiations in which trade barriers have been reduced, policy makers may then relax labor 
standards in order to return the volume of imports closer to their pre-negotiation level.  
Bargaining efficiency can be achieved only when border controls are negotiated simultaneously 
with the protectionist content of labor standards, thereby constraining policy makers from 
replacing protectionist border controls with protectionist labor standards.   
 
Bargaining Complementarities 
A fourth and final argument in favor of linking does not necessarily concern whether 
trade sanctions will be used to enforce labor standards, but rather deals with whether issues of 
labor standards should be included in a new multilateral round of negotiations under the auspices 
of the WTO.  Developing countries are resisting this, as are most trade economists, while 
Europeans tend to favor it and in the United States, Republicans and Democrats are divided on 
the issue.  The alternative to including labor standards in a new round is, of course, to leave 
labor standards as they are now, confined to the ILO. 
Arguments against doing this will be discussed in the next section, but an argument in 
favor needs to be stated here, and it is a simple application of a more general principle.  The   19
principle is that when countries negotiate on multiple issues, all can gain by linking those 
negotiations.  The reason is simple:  this permits countries to exchange concessions on one issue 
for gains on others, thus permitting a more efficient outcome that benefits all.  For example, it 
may be that although developing countries would prefer not to give ground on labor standards, 
they also are seeking more market access in textiles and clothing than developed countries are 
willing to provide.  If their desire for market access exceeds their unwillingness to raise labor 
standards, then they may gain by giving up something on labor standards in exchange for market 
access.  Alternatively, if their concern about raising labor standards is the greater, then they 
might be willing to sacrifice some market access for that.
7  Either way, depending on their 
preferences, linking the two issues permits them to achieve what they will regard as a better 
outcome, something that they could not do if negotiations on the two issues were to remain 
separate.
8 
This is actually a familiar principle for trade specialists, who have long recognized the 
benefits of negotiating over diverse trade issues within a single round, rather than handling each 
of them separately.  Even when only tariffs were being negotiated, this permitted countries to 
exchange their own tariff cuts in some sectors for their trading partners’ cuts in others.  This 
facilitated the substantial reductions in tariffs that were achieved through the early rounds of 
negotiation under the GATT.  The Tokyo Round extended the scope of negotiations beyond 
tariffs, although these tradeoffs were hampered by the use of separate codes for each of the 
                                                                 
7 Note that what actually matters is not just one party’s relative preferences, but these compared to the 
relative preferences of the other negotiating party.  See Bagwell and Staiger (2001) and Staiger (2001) for a 
case that can be made that permits WTO member countries to trade off between changes in tariffs and 
changes in national labor standards as a way of providing secure market access for foreign exporters. 
8 See Horstmann et al. (2000).   20
new issues, codes that countries could sign onto or not as they chose.  The Uruguay Round 
achieved much more by returning to the all-or-nothing package approach of previous rounds, 
permitting countries to exchange, say, concessions on agricultural subsidies for concessions on 
trade in industrial products. 
In fact, the principle was most evident on two issues of great importance to developing 
countries:  market access in textiles and clothing, and intellectual property rights.  Developing 
countries eventually accepted the TRIPS agreement, despite what they viewed as its cost to 
them, as the price to pay for eventual ending of the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA).  Of 
course, this example also illustrates the dangers of accepting tradeoffs of this sort:  many 
developing countries today are unhappy with the deal that they made. 
 
IV.  Arguments against Linking 
 
A first argument against linking trade and labor standards is simply to question the 
efficacy of labor standards themselves.  Nobody questions the ultimate desirability of improving 
conditions for workers.  However, one may easily question whether simply imposing better 
conditions will in fact make all workers better off.  The concern is analogous to the traditional 
economists’ argument against a minimum wage, but it applies to all manner of labor standards.  
If higher standards are imposed, then the cost of hiring labor will rise and fewer workers will be 
employed.  The result will be better conditions for some, but worse for others.  Economists will 
also point out, in this situation, that those who gain would be unable to compensate the losers, 
even in principle, because the outcome is inefficient.  But that may be beside the point, since the 
harm to the losers in itself may be enough to condemn the policy in most minds.   21
Of course, this argument applies with different force for different labor standards, 
depending on the likely numbers of winners and losers, and also on whether labor markets really 
work this way.  Many would accept this argument as applied to a minimum wage in developing 
countries, and indeed most who favor linking trade and labor standards reject trying to raise 
wages in developing countries above market levels.   
But other labor standards, such as the Fundamental ILO Conventions mentioned above, 
may be less likely to harm workers, may actually enhance labor market efficiency, or may 
embody issues of principle that should override simple economic costs and benefits.  Thus, 
freedom of association may be viewed as necessary in order for labor markets to work 
properly, given what otherwise would be an extreme asymmetry between the market powers of 
employers and employed.  Forced labor, too, is hardly a case of a properly functioning labor 
market, which ought to have voluntary participation from both sides.  Child labor, on the other 
hand, may be a case of principle, which should be prohibited even if the children and their 
parents believe that the work makes them better off.  For both cases, however, we would plead 
that enforcement of labor standards not be accepted too uncritically, and that what truly 
happens to all affected workers (not just those who remain employed) should be taken into 
account. 
Suppose, now, that we accept that certain labor standards do need to be imposed on 
labor markets.  What, then, can be wrong with using trade sanctions to enforce these 
standards?  The answer depends in part on whether the threatened sanctions turn out to be used 
or not.  In any system of sanctions (trade or otherwise), the purpose is to achieve the standards,   22
not to apply the sanctions.  But the system will not likely work unless the sanctions are 
sometimes applied. 
If they are, then the world suffers the costs of distorted trade that we trade economists 
routinely teach to our students.  Is that the only cost of using trade sanctions?  If so, then the 
case against them would be weak, since costs of distorted trade are unlikely to be very large in 
comparison with the gains that are sought by imposing the labor standards.  However, there is a 
more important cost.  That is, trade sanctions, if applied, are likely to hurt most the workers 
who were intended to benefit from the labor standards.  For example, suppose that a country 
prevents its workers from organizing in its export industries, and that the world responds by 
restricting those exports.  Then these workers, who were presumably already suffering from 
their lack of union representation, now lose their jobs as well. 
All of this assumes that trade sanctions, if permitted, will only be applied where the 
failure of labor standards justifies their use.  However, there is good reason to worry that this 
will not be the case.  Trade sanctions are restrictions on trade, and, when used, they benefit the 
firms and workers that compete with the restricted imports.  We know from long experience 
that whenever conditions for restricting trade are accepted as legitimate or written into law – as 
for example in antidumping and countervailing duty statutes – industries become very aggressive 
and creative in asserting that these conditions have been met.  Who could be better placed to 
identify abuses of labor standards abroad than the domestic competitors of supposedly 
offending foreign firms?  But also, who could have better reason to identify abuses where there 
are none, since they will then be rewarded with protection?  It is this concern, that trade   23
sanctions will be co-opted for protectionist purposes, that most worries both trade specialists 
like ourselves and developing country trade negotiators. 
It is also this concern about protectionism that makes us doubtful of the alternative 
argument that trade sanctions will seldom be used, only threatened.  If in fact this were the case, 
then the harm we have ascribed to the sanctions themselves would not arise (although the caveat 
remains that forcing higher labor standards may be harmful).
9  But the forces of protectionism 
have shown themselves to be both strong and insistent, sure to exploit any loophole in WTO 
rules that may be provided.  It seems likely that whenever abuses of labor standards are alleged, 
no amount of response by raising standards will be enough to satisfy those who will seek to 
exploit the situation by seeking protection.  This will include not only those who benefit from the 
trade sanctions that are applied, but also those who benefit from easier competition with the 
industries where standards are raised.  The prospect that somehow these protectionist interests 
will drop their case when valid abuses have been corrected seems distinctly unlikely.  Trade 
sanctions are likely to become the norm, not the exception.  
These ideas have been formalized by Limao (2000), who points out that linkage of 
trade and labor standards within a single negotiating environment can enhance the political 
power of those who seek protection, thereby making it more difficult to sustain a cooperative 
agreement.  He examines the case in which there is a powerful lobby that advocates in favor of 
producers in the import-competing sector.  In such a situation, linkage can destroy enforcement 
power. 
                                                                 
9 See Srinivasan (1998) and Pahre (1998) for a discussion of how the “hijacking” of the concern for labor 
standards by protectionist forces may influence the adoption of higher standards and affect the economic 
welfare of the countries.  See also Singh (2001).   24
Consider, for example, a situation in which a powerful import-competing lobby is 
affecting trade policy.  The lobby may reward policy makers for defecting from an international 
agreement.  Obviously, the larger the import-competing sector, the larger the reward the lobby 
will be willing to pay for obtaining additional protection on its behalf, because the economic 
rents reaped from protection are roughly proportional to industry output.  In a linked agreement, 
the lobby calculates the reward that it is willing to pay based on the size of the industry once 
defection from the international agreement has occurred.  Thus, when the lobby calculates its 
willingness to pay for defection from a labor agreement, it realizes that the defection will also 
trigger a collapse of the linked trade agreement.  As a consequence, the industry base benefiting 
from relaxed labor standards will be larger than it would have been in the absence of linkage. 
A similar consideration applies when calculating the benefits of defection from a trade 
agreement.  In other words, from the point of view of the lobby, there are complementarities 
between trade and labor standards that increase the payoff from defection.  Such 
complementarities within a linked agreement raise the cost of compliance, making cooperation 
more difficult to sustain. 
 
V.  Advice for Developing Countries 
 
Given these arguments, what position should developing countries take in engaging in 
multilateral negotiations?  Should they continue to resist bringing labor standards into the WTO, 
or should they not?   25
On balance, our view is that the dangers of using trade sanctions to enforce labor 
standards outweigh the benefits, both in terms of likely protectionism and in harm to affected 
workers.  Therefore, we would prefer that labor issues be left out of the WTO.  For the same 
reasons, we concur with the position that most developing countries have taken, arguing against 
the inclusion of labor standards in the WTO.  It is true that by giving up something in labor 
standards, developing countries might be able to get other benefits that would be worth even 
more.  But experience with TRIPS suggests that they might regret this later on. 
However, we also believe that whatever their position on labor standards, the overriding 
interest of developing countries is in the continued successful functioning of the WTO system.  
Even though the WTO is not explicitly intended to help developing countries, we believe that it 
offers them their best protection from being victims of developed country trade policies, for 
reasons touched on earlier.  With that in mind, whatever position developing countries take on 
labor standards should not get in the way of the ability of the WTO to continue to do its job. 
In particular, while developing countries should be advised continue to resist inclusion of 
labor standards on the multilateral negotiating agenda, circumstances could arise such that the 
only way to get agreement on a negotiating round would be to permit labor standards to enter it 
in a small way.  Developing countries might accept this and then do their best to deal with the 
issue in their own interests during the round. 
There are several different channels through which labor standards might enter the 
WTO, some more problematic than others.  It has been suggested, for example in OECD 
(1996), that poorly protected labor standards might constitute dumping under GATT 1994 
Article VI, or be interpreted as a subsidy under GATT 1994 Article XVI.  But the most direct   26
approach would be to add poorly protected labor rights to the list of general exceptions 
articulated in Article XX.  However, a complaint under these three articles would likely generate 
a long, detailed, and potentially intrusive discussion as to what constitutes poorly protected 
worker rights, and whether harm has been done to domestic interests. 
Bagwell and Staiger have alternatively suggested that labor standards be dealt with 
under the Nullification and Impairment clause.  In their conceptualization of international trade 
negotiations, countries can be thought of as agreeing to a certain level of market access.  
Changes in domestic policies that reduce that access can then become the basis of a nullification 
and impairment complaint. They recommend that Article XXIII be amended to require countries 
that loosen labor standards in their import-competing industries to compensate foreign suppliers 
with an offsetting tariff reduction that restores the volume of trade to the previously agreed upon 
level.  In order to create symmetry, countries that tighten labor standards in their import-
competing industries, which have the effect of expanding import demand, are then also entitled 
to raise import tariffs to offset the impact on the volume of trade. 
The virtue of the Bagwell-Staiger mechanism is that it removes any incentive to alter 
labor standards so as to gain a strategic advantage internationally.  The international trade 
implications for labor standards would be neutralized by equal and offsetting changes in tariffs.  
As a consequence, governments become free to consider only the efficiency effects of labor 
standards and need not be concerned with the implications for international competitiveness. 
  An additional virtue of the Bagwell-Staiger approach is that it focuses the attention of 
the WTO on the implications of heterogeneous labor standards on international competitiveness.  
That is, the Nullification and Impairment clause, as envisioned by Bagwell and Staiger, can be   27
used to prevent a “race to the bottom” in international labor standards that may otherwise occur 
if trade policy is largely controlled by import-competing interests. 
  By contrast, the General Exceptions provision is more likely to be used to focus 
attention on moral and humanitarian concerns with the nature of production in developing 
countries.  However, as we have discussed above, trade sanctions are not a very attractive 
device for expressing humanitarian concerns.  Trade sanctions are likely to hurt the very people 
we are trying to help in focusing on worker rights.  Furthermore, reliance on the General 
Exceptions provision requires us to attempt to agree on universally accepted language on 
worker rights that can be codified in international trade law.  Some statements about labor 
standards may be attractive as general goals, but they vary too much across countries to be 
defined as rights that should be enforced by trade sanctions. 
 
VI.  Epilogue 
 
This paper was initially written prior to the conclusion of the WTO Ministerial Meeting 
convened in Doha, Qatar, in November 2001 for the purpose of designing the agenda for a new 
round of multilateral trade negotiations.  Following 9/11, the United States and other WTO 
members had an incentive to downplay the disputes that had led to the failure of the Seattle 
Ministerial Meeting in December 1999 and to adopt a more cooperative position in launching a 
new trade round in 2002.  It was also the case that the Bush Administration did not favor linking 
trade and labor standards in the WTO.  Thus, for now, the issue of linkage in moot, and the 
ILO will continue to have the institutional responsibility for the oversight of international labor   28
standards.  But the fact remains that there is continued support for linkage on the part of 
organized labor, as well by many human and labor rights NGOs in the United States and some 
other industrialized countries.  The issues that we have discussed in this paper may well 
therefore re-emerge in the future when economic and political conditions change and linkage 
issues will again be prominent in the policy dialogue. 
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